Reverse thrust: How Russia’s new aircraft developers drag their feet and cover up their failures

RU

Old plane, new engines

In mid-March, Rostec announced the first flight of a short-haul “Superjet” equipped with Russian-made PD-8 engines — or, at least, that’s the way the event was described in the state corporation’s statement. The aircraft that took off was a 2018-built Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SSJ-100) that had been re-engined. The fully localized version is supposed to be called the SJ-100, though it’s still sometimes referred to simply as “Superjet New.” A full test flight of the completely import-substituted aircraft is planned for April.

The PD-8 engine, which Rostec chief Sergey Chemezov calls the “heart of the aircraft,” is expected to receive its type certification in the fall of 2025. Only after that can work begin on certifying the fully import-substituted version of the aircraft. In total, developers need to replace about 40 foreign-made systems and components, including avionics, landing gear, the auxiliary power unit, the integrated control system, power supply, air conditioning, and fire protection systems. Rostec has yet to clarify which of these have already been replaced, which are still in development, and how much longer the whole process will take.

Russian state media have framed the flight as a major breakthrough, claiming it removes the last technological barrier to creating a full-fledged alternative to Boeing and Airbus planes. But even the aviation experts they interviewed remain cautious, estimating that — at best — import-substituted SJ-100s won’t start reaching airlines until 2027. As Roman Gusarov, editor-in-chief of the Avia.ru Network, points out, the aircraft still has to complete hundreds of certification flights before it can be cleared for commercial use — a process that will take years.

Developing a commercially viable engine for the SJ-100 would indeed be a breakthrough for Russia’s aviation industry. However, the timing and circumstances of this supposed achievement raise doubts about whether it’s a genuine milestone or simply an attempt to cover up failure.

How the government’s aviation plans fell apart

In early March 2022 — shortly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the first aviation-related sanctions — Vladimir Putin ordered the urgent development of new Russian aircraft in order to fully replace foreign-made planes as quickly as possible. The models in question had already been in development for years — some for over a decade.

By then, the world’s largest aircraft manufacturers — America’s Boeing, Europe’s Airbus, and Brazil’s Embraer — had already severed all ties with Russian airlines. A year later, in 2023, China also dropped its suddenly toxic Russian partner from the joint CR929 long-haul jet project, as even Beijing was unable to replace critical engines and other key components sourced from the U.S. and Europe.

In response to Putin’s directive, the Russian government promised to produce 1,036 domestically made aircraft within eight years, as outlined in the Comprehensive Program for the Development of the Aviation Industry through 2030. However, of the eight models listed in the plan, only two — the Tu-214 and Il-96-300, both modernized Soviet designs — actually had any history of operational use. Two years later, in May 2024, the program’s initial promises were quietly scaled back, with the production target reduced to 990 aircraft. According to First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, both the quantity and delivery timelines will be adjusted at the end of 2025 after the MC-21 and SJ-100 receive certification.

Manturov did not specify exactly how the numbers would change, but shortly before his announcement, Rostec head Sergey Chemezov suggested that by 2030, Russia should aim to produce just 200 aircraft to replace foreign-made jets. If he was referring only to large passenger planes, excluding small aviation, this would mean a 2.5-fold reduction in the initial plan. If his statement applied to the entire aviation sector, the promised output would drop by a staggering factor of five.

By early 2025, officials had expected to have 109 new import-substituted aircraft ready — but not a single plane has been fully completed. Over the past few years, Russia’s aviation industry has managed to assemble only a handful of SSJ-100s using stockpiled imported components (meaning they are not import-substituted), two Il-96-300s, and one restored Tu-214, along with a newly built Tu-214 — also outfitted with foreign-made parts.

The models that never took off

Problems arose not only when it came to genuinely complex tasks like engine development, but also with projects that should have been well within the capabilities of Russia’s aviation industry.

The only aircraft that remained on schedule was the wide-body Il-96-300, which didn’t require import substitution in the first place. In 2022 and 2023, the Voronezh Aircraft Plant delivered one plane per year. The main operator of the Il-96-300 is the Rossiya Special Flight Squadron, which serves the Presidential Administration. Russian commercial airlines abandoned this model long ago due to its high operating costs — but for top government officials, that’s not a concern.

But the Il-96-300 has been rolling off the assembly line since 1988 at exactly this production rate, and going forward, only three units per year are planned. Calling this progress would be a stretch.

Formally, there are no delays with the TVRS-44 Ladoga turboprop (which seats 44 passengers), as deliveries were originally planned to start later in 2025. However, the timeline has already been pushed back to 2028, meaning that, just as in 2022, the aircraft is still officially three years away from reaching airlines. Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov declined to give a completion date for the Ladoga project, stating only that funding for development work is ongoing.

The project to produce the light aircraft L-410 — a Russian adaptation of the Czech L-410, designed to carry 19 passengers — has been scrapped. The plan had been to build 58 of these aircraft by 2025, but the idea was abandoned due to difficulties in replacing key systems. In its place, the Russian-Belarusian Osvey, a plane of the same capacity, was announced. A year later, however, nothing is known about the project beyond its name. Still, deliveries are supposed to begin in 2027, with a total of 158 aircraft to be built by 2030. In March 2025, Denis Manturov stated that by April, only the aircraft’s technical design would be finalized.

The situation with the Tu-214 is perhaps the most absurd. This is a reliable, production-ready aircraft that is already in operation but simply requires modernization. That process, however, has been critically delayed due to increased government defense orders — aircraft component suppliers simply can’t keep up, as Dmitry Khoruzhik, head of Aviasystemy, explained back in February 2023. It appears that production bottlenecks remain unresolved. In May 2024, Aeroflot signed a contract with Rostec to purchase 11 Tu-214s, but only on the condition that the aircraft be upgraded. Just weeks later, Aeroflot CEO Sergey Alexandrovsky admitted that the airline was looking for ways to back out of the deal, as production timelines continue to slip further.

Most likely, the issue isn’t just about deadlines. A year before signing the contract, Aeroflot had already demanded nearly 100 modifications to the Tu-214’s cabin and insisted on purchasing only aircraft that could be operated by a two-person crew — rather than the current three-person configuration offered by the manufacturer. Thanks to automation, modern airliners no longer require a flight engineer, and such specialists have all but disappeared from the labor market. In the end, adapting the aircraft to these requirements proved unachievable.

Between the signing of the contract and Aeroflot’s announcement that it was reconsidering the deal, the Kazan Aviation Training Center began training flight engineers — whose only likely role would be serving on Tu-214 crews. By late February 2025, the Kazan Aircraft Plant (KAZ) had contracts to produce 23 of these planes, though the customers were not disclosed. The production plan for the year called for four units, which would have been the highest figure since 2011. However, it is already clear that KAZ won’t meet this target and will produce just one aircraft.

Work on the Il-114-300, a 64-seat regional airliner, was halted in 2021 following a crash in Kubinka. During one of its first flights, an Il-112V light military transport plane went down. It was equipped with the same TV7-117ST engines intended for the civilian Il-114-300, and experts identified engine failure as the likely cause of the accident.

Flight testing with the TV7-117ST-01 engine — the updated version that received its type certificate in January 2023 — began in March 2024. The process has been proceeding quietly, though Alikhanov stated in late February that the aircraft could be expected to receive certification by the end of the year. According to the latest version of the aviation development program, the first three planes should be delivered to customers in 2026. Three years ago, deliveries were expected to start in 2024.

The medium-haul MS-21 aircraft is also expected to start production this year (originally scheduled for 2024), but it’s already clear that these timelines will not be met, as testing has not yet begun. In October 2024, Chemezov stated that MS-21 deliveries to airlines would begin in 2025. A month later, Mishustin gave the same timeline. However, in December, Ivan Batanov, Director of Network and Revenue Management at Aeroflot, accidentally publicly admitted that the first MS-21 would only arrive in 2026. He was immediately fired. Around the same time, Alikhanov began announcing the first flight of the SJ-100 and the import-substituted MS-21 version, planned for the end of March or early April 2025.

The problem with the MS-21 lies in domestic composite materials and systems, which have caused the aircraft’s weight to increase by nearly 6 tons. This weight gain resulted in the flight range being cut in half, down to 2,800 km. Some sources suggested that the range is even as low as 2,000 km, which takes the aircraft out of the medium-haul category. Considering fuel consumption, these parameters render the aircraft commercially unfeasible. It is unclear now which airlines would be interested in an aircraft with such high operating costs.

The range issues were indirectly confirmed by both Manturov and Chemezov, who discussed the possibility of developing a shortened version of the MS-21 — a fundamentally new aircraft. The first deputy prime minister even let slip in September of last year that the shorter version would allow for more efficient operation of the aircraft, given its weight characteristics. Reducing capacity would indeed help decrease the weight and increase the range, but from a commercial perspective, this development would likely leave it behind even the Tu-214.

The light aircraft Baikal, with a capacity of 9 people, has been in development since 2019, and is intended to replace the Soviet-era An-2, better known as the “crop duster.” The issue with the Baikal clearly struck a nerve with Putin. He first demanded an explanation for the constant delays in the aircraft’s delivery schedule during a meeting on the development of infrastructure in the Russian Far East. Later, at a plenary session of the forum, he called for speeding up the development of the Baikal and making it significantly cheaper.

First Deputy Prime Minister Manturov had to explain that the delays were due to the lack of a domestic engine and propeller (a complex component for which there is a shortage of expertise in Russia). He stated that delivery, taking into account the necessary work, could not be expected before 2026 — this despite the fact that, in an updated aviation development program released mere months earlier, it was stated that five Baikals were set to be delivered to customers in 2025.

The creator of the design documentation for the Baikal aircraft is the Ural Civil Aviation Plant (UZGA). In January, rumors emerged that its board of directors would be headed by Mikhail Pogosyan. A month later, it was reported that the project would be frozen due to “dramatic mistakes” made during the design phase. The aircraft “essentially needs to be assembled from scratch,” because the issues extend beyond just the engine and propeller (which, unsurprisingly, are also not ready).

In March, the Ministry of Industry and Trade announced a tender for new research and development work worth 10.4 billion rubles($123 million), which was again won by the Ural Civil Aviation Plant — the only participant. The work is expected to be completed by the end of 2027. Therefore, Putin was confronted with the fact that even the new “crop duster,” promised for 2024, would not be delivered on time, and development was once again postponed for several years.

Meaningless reshuffling

“Too long, way too long. Please, I ask you to speed up this work,” Vladimir Putin urged Manturov in 2023 regarding the aviation industry. “Why actually are you fooling around?” Putin managed to secure promises that the first SSJ-New aircraft would be delivered to airlines in 2023, but these promises were not fulfilled. The prototype of the “Superjet New” did fly, but it did so with the Franco-Russian SaM146 engine.

The problems of the aviation industry are being addressed via the reshuffling of officials. In early November 2024, Yuri Slyusar, who had been CEO of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) since 2015, was appointed acting head of the Rostov region. He was replaced by Vadim Badeha, who had previously headed the United Engine Corporation (UEC). At the same time, the CEO of PJSC Yakovlev (SJ-100 and MS-21), Andrey Boginsky, and the managing director of Tupolev JSC (Tu-214), Konstantin Timofeev, resigned. Sources in the aviation industry claimed that Boginsky was dismissed under direct orders from Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin “for the failure of the civil aviation program.”

The new head of UAC, Badeha, had been CEO of the Ural Civil Aviation Plant since 2009. After he took over management of the company, it shifted from private ownership to the jurisdiction of “Oboronprom” — a structure within “Rostekhnologii” (later renamed Rostech). The previous owners had complained for years about attempts to seize the company, but they were ultimately unable to protect the asset.

Even after moving to UEC, Badeha retained his position as chairman of the board of UZGA. This meant he was directly responsible for the work on the L-410, Ladoga, and Baikal projects. UEC, UZGA, and UAC all fall under the Rostech umbrella, so the top manager had been moving within the same state corporation managed by Chemezov.

A source familiar with Badeha's work in the Urals describes him as a capable manager who knows how to make the most of the resources at his disposal, but not a particularly independent figure. For a long time, Badeha managed to avoid major failures in his work. However, when UZGA started receiving orders that the company simply did not have the capacity or expertise to fulfill, he — whether on his own initiative or acting on instructions from above — began finding ways to formally check off the tasks, masking the lack of actual results.

Before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, this strategy seemed to be working. After the crash of the Il-112V with the TV7-117ST engine, UEC initially gave up on the engine, but under Badeha’s leadership, it was reworked and sent for testing once again. There have been no results — but neither have there been any new accidents. The process has stretched out indefinitely. Now, the head of UAC reports to Mishustin that after resuming tests, the plane has completed just 20% of its certification flights over the course of a year.

Even the promises seem strange

With the leaders of Russia’s aviation industry under pressure to produce results, the SJ-100 with domestic engines did manage to take flight, staying airborne for 40 minutes. But does this prove the engine is ready? Not at all. Only once the type certificate is granted — after testing the engine under all necessary conditions for safe operation — can that conclusion be made. A year ago, it was the PD-8 engine’s performance issues in certain modes that prevented full-scale testing and were blamed for the delays in the aircraft’s delivery timeline.

One particularly questionable aspect of the test flight is the fact that the aircraft that took to the skies was a 2018 model. According to UAC, about 40 imported systems and components are being replaced, which is why older versions are still being used. However, after another “first” flight of the SJ-New in August 2023, it was stated that around 40 systems and components had already been replaced on the “import-independent” Superjet. This suggests that in 2023, everything except the engine was ready and undergoing flight tests, but by 2025, the engine is ready, while everything else still needs to be finalized and tested.

It seems there's still much work to be done. In February, the Ministry of Industry and Trade posted a tender on the government procurement website worth 27.6 billion rubles ($327 million) to develop components for the SJ-100. The task is expected to be completed in three years, with funds allocated to improving the aircraft's operational performance, takeoff-landing characteristics, and overall reliability. Whether certification will happen before this work is done, and whether a new certification will be needed afterward, remains to be seen.

There’s no denying that the Russian aviation industry has yet to achieve significant milestones: none of the necessary steps for delivering aircraft to airlines have been completed, with only intermediate processes in progress. However, for those responsible for civil aviation — a group that had previously made obviously unrealistic promises — there was a strong incentive to quickly show Putin that things are moving forward.

Additionally, there’s a renewed hope that sanctions may soon be lifted, which could pave the way for purchasing trusted Boeing and Airbus aircraft or resuming foreign component supplies, ultimately resolving the issue. The priority right now is to buy time, and the first flight of the SJ-100 with PD-8 engines might just achieve that goal.