A court without honor: Armenian leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh turn from defendants into hostages

RU

“The illegal and fabricated ‘trial’ of the military-political leadership of Artsakh held in Baku continues. Many of them are subjected to torture and humiliation, hunger and deprivation,” wrote the former Ombudsman of Nagorno-Karabakh on X. Simultaneously, Armenian groups, including the country’s government, advocated for an urgent resolution in the European Parliament condemning Azerbaijan.

With no independent legal representation, the proceedings — widely condemned in Armenia as a “sham trial” — underscore the gravity of the defendants' predicament.

There is ample evidence to justify calling the trial a “sham,” yet Azerbaijan maintains that everything is proceeding lawfully. In fact, Baku goes further, accusing Armenia of exposing its own culpability in supporting “separatism” in Nagorno-Karabakh by standing behind the accused.

After a swift offensive from September 19-20, 2023, over 100,000 Armenians were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh. This mass exodus not only ended a millennia-long Armenian presence in the region but also brought the final phase of the decades-long conflict to a dramatic close. In Azerbaijan, the victory of Baku’s forces was met with celebrations replete with national flags and triumphant speeches. In Armenia, the stream of displaced civilians flowing in from the lost territory seemed endless.

Not everyone escaped. Nagorno-Karabakh’s political leadership, along with a number of prisoners of war, now face war crimes charges in Azerbaijan. It quickly became evident that prosecuting the leaders was a priority for Baku. While Azerbaijan framed the trials as a pursuit of justice, they also served a political purpose — scapegoats were needed in order to assign blame for the conflict.

Since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan has recognized the power of POWs as bargaining chips. In a 2021 recording, President Ilham Aliyev even joked to his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that such captives offered excellent leverage in negotiations — despite the clear legal protections granted to them under the laws of war.

Though the political leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh falls into a different category, their function for Azerbaijan remains largely the same: they are a tool that can be used to exert pressure on Armenia.

From oligarch to philanthropist

Ruben Vardanyan is just one of 16 people on trial, yet in Azerbaijan, he has been singled out as the most prominent among them, with his case being separated from the others. This despite the fact that Vardanyan had been in Nagorno-Karabakh for barely a year before being seized by Azerbaijani authorities following the lightning offensive of September 2023. The charges against him are more numerous than those against the others, and mentions of him in Azerbaijani media far exceed those of the rest of the defendants.

The reason is almost certainly not that he accomplished more than the others during his time in Nagorno-Karabakh, but rather his status within the Armenian community.

Until he renounced his Russian citizenship in 2022 and relocated to Nagorno-Karabakh, Vardanyan remained a divisive figure. To some, his background as a Russian oligarch — coupled with allegations of corruption — was a stain on his reputation. However, as his philanthropic efforts in Armenia gained traction nearly two decades ago, public perception began to shift. He founded the Aurora Prize for Human Rights with the backing of George Clooney and invested heavily in humanitarian initiatives, gradually reshaping his image.

Foreign diplomats primarily know him thanks to the fact that many have sent their children to the international school in Dilijan, which he co-founded.

In the fall of 2022, Vardanyan was appointed State Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto government. His perceived close ties to Moscow are widely thought to have played a key role in this decision, as security in the disputed region had largely depended on the presence of 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops ever since the trilateral ceasefire agreement was signed in November 2020 following more than a month of heavy fighting.

However, when Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, it did not take long before Vardanyan was dismissed. Despite this, he chose to continue to live in the area, remaining actively involved in the region’s affairs.

Vardanyan is both widely respected among Armenians and is internationally recognized — making him the ideal scapegoat for Azerbaijan.

Political prisoners line up

In the summer of 2023, Azerbaijan launched its latest crackdown on civil society, sparked by protests against the expansion of a mine in the small village of Soyudlu in the country’s western region (not to be confused with the irredentist notion of “Western Azerbaijan”). The demonstrations led to mass arrests, and today more than 350 individuals are imprisoned on political grounds, with their trials widely condemned by international human rights organizations.

There is little reason to believe that the trial of Nagorno-Karabakh’s political leadership will be any different. However, these individuals are notably absent from the lists of political prisoners compiled by Azerbaijani human rights organizations.

One reason for this is that, from an Azerbaijani perspective, there may be justification for prosecuting the leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh. With memories of the 1990s war, few — even within Azerbaijani civil society — openly sympathize with Armenians.

Another reason is that anything related to Nagorno-Karabakh remains a highly sensitive issue for the regime in Baku. The few Azerbaijanis who have criticized the government’s violent “solution” to the conflict are themselves in prison today. They stand accused of espionage for having contacts with Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh — a clear contradiction given that the regime claims to support meetings with Armenians as part of a lasting peace process.

Furthermore, prosecutions for violations of international law are complex, and the risk of an unfair trial increases in the absence of international oversight. For example, an international tribunal was established to prosecute war criminals during the series of conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. The court was set up in 1993 and concluded its work through 2017.

Another significant issue is the fact that the legal representatives of the Armenian political leaders have been denied entry into Azerbaijan. Instead, the defendants have been offered Azerbaijani-appointed lawyers, who are not seen as independent from the state. In other words, the defendants are being tried without the presence of legal counsel who truly represent them.

Communication falls silent

The only channel of communication for the political prisoners has been through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). With its special mandate as an independent body, the humanitarian organization has played a crucial role in establishing contact between prisoners and their families.

Sources with insight into the situation report that all political prisoners share cells in pairs — except for Ruben Vardanyan, who is held alone. Phone calls to Armenia have taken place a few times per month, and through these calls, messages and instructions have been conveyed. For example, Vardanyan warned that any statements allegedly signed by him should not be believed. In March, his final message conveyed through the ICRC sparked widespread sympathy for his plight.

These messages appear to have angered the Azerbaijani government, which subsequently revoked the ICRC’s accreditation in the country. Several UN agencies were also expelled. This decision followed growing frustration within Azerbaijan’s leadership over the ICRC’s neutral stance on Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead, Azerbaijan intends to assign its own Red Crescent Society to carry out some of ICRC’s tasks. However, an internal review within the Red Cross movement was triggered after an investigation by OCCRP linked Azerbaijan’s Red Crescent to the regime (the author participated in that investigation).

According to this logic, Azerbaijan intends to provide political prisoners with communication through its own channels — a move that would likely be viewed as a public ploy in the eyes of the international community. A contact within the ICRC suggested that the Azerbaijani Red Crescent likely lacks the mandate to replace the ICRC’s role in facilitating communication between prisoners and their families. The ICRC’s press office has also stated that it has no information on whether any alternative communication channels will be established.

In response, around 40 Armenian humanitarian organizations have united in an appeal to the Armenian Government, urging them to advocate for Switzerland to represent Armenia’s interests in Baku. Under the Vienna Convention, which governs diplomatic relations, Armenia could designate a third-party country — such as Switzerland — to act as its consular representative.

However, such a request must come from the Armenian government, a step that would likely prompt a negative reaction from Azerbaijan. This further reinforces the perception that the detained political leaders are being held as hostages. Indeed, international institutions such as the European Parliament have used such language to describe the Armenian defendants’ plight, stating that, “these hostages are being subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment.”

A more proactive approach from the side of the Armenian Government would involve advocating for European ambassadors in Azerbaijan to attend the trials, a pressure tactic similar to what has been employed in Georgia over the past six months.

Not part of the peace agreement

Meanwhile, Ruben Vardanyan’s American lawyer has been outspoken in his criticism of the Armenian government, accusing it of not doing enough to support his client. Similar concerns have been raised by large segments of Armenian civil society and opposition groups.

A series of rallies took place near the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government buildings, with representatives of public groups demanding that the country's authorities take measures to release the prisoners and condemn their trial as political and illegal.

This criticism comes at a time when peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan have reached a deadlock. Although the Azerbaijani side announced on March 13 that a final draft of the peace deal had been reached, the Armenian side emphasized that no timeline has been set for its signing.

One of the key issues in the peace negotiations between the two countries concerns the withdrawal of ongoing cases against each other at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. Through a series of interim rulings, Armenia currently holds a legal advantage over Azerbaijan. For example, in November 2023, the ICJ issued interim measures guaranteeing the right of Karabakh Armenians to return.

One idea that has been raised is to include the withdrawal of legal proceedings against Nagorno-Karabakh’s political leadership (referred to as “hostages” in Armenia). However, Azerbaijan has drawn a clear red line on this issue. This is evident in the country’s public rhetoric, in which it repeatedly insists that the international community should not interfere in its “internal affairs.”

Armenia has been hesitant to commit to withdrawing its ICJ cases. One reason is that doing so would definitively end any Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, Azerbaijan continues to regularly threaten Armenia with military action, which could be seen as an attempt to strengthen its negotiating position — if one even believes that Azerbaijan is truly interested in signing the peace deal.

The state of limbo between war and peace ultimately works in Azerbaijan’s favor, enabling Baku to manage international criticism while simultaneously escalating both the conflict and domestic repression.

In early March, Armenia’s legal representative at the ICJ, Yeghishe Kirakosyan, submitted his resignation. Experts have downplayed his departure’s significance, but given the recent news about the draft deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it appears likely that he stepped down due to reports that Armenia may withdraw the cases.

What is certain is that Azerbaijan demands that before a peace deal on Nagorno-Karabakh can be signed, Armenia must first completely abandon any claims or processes — whether territorial or rights-based.

This is where the political leadership becomes relevant once again. As things stand, neither the prisoners of war nor the political leaders are explicitly included in the peace process. As mentioned earlier, Azerbaijan has refused to accept the “hostages” to the negotiating table. Still, a somewhat speculative argument, discussed in several conversations with legal experts and diplomats in the course of this analysis, is that their release could come as a result of the peace talks. The reasoning is that if the ICJ cases are dropped, there would be no remaining charges against the detainees.

The challenge, however, is that Azerbaijan does not recognize the prisoners of war as such — nor does it recognize the political leadership in this context. There is, therefore, a significant risk that this calculation could fail to prove predictive.

A rift in the Armenian camps

Opposition figures in Armenia often resist viewing the issue from a domestic political perspective. Their reasoning is based on the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh’s political leadership has largely been in opposition to the Armenian government.

This divide became particularly evident after 2020. Perhaps the clearest fault line has been the stance on Russia, where Nagorno-Karabakh’s security dependence on Moscow clashed with Armenia’s pivot toward the West. Put simply, while the two previously shared a somewhat similar geopolitical agenda, after 2020 they diverged.

As a result, according to this perspective, the Armenian government’s incentives to advocate for the political prisoners have been more humanitarian than practical, and images of the seemingly battered Vardanyan have sparked sympathy across almost all political factions, including in the government.

One indication of official Yeravan’s engagement with the issue is the intensified advocacy effort in the EU in recent weeks. For instance, on March 13, the European Parliament voted on a non-binding resolution critical of Azerbaijan.

Yet the division within Armenian political circles is something Azerbaijan is leveraging. At its core, Azerbaijan knows that growing internal criticism against the Armenian government — regardless of whether that criticism is justified — fuels political polarization within Armenia.

Baku’s tactic of imposing absolute demands on Armenia has proven to be highly effective at destabilizing Yerevan’s domestic political landscape. This approach is particularly significant given that Armenia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections by 2026. In addition, the country’s prime minister has announced a referendum on constitutional amendments that are widely viewed as a concession to Azerbaijan’s demands in the peace negotiations.

Ultimately, Azerbaijan’s legal actions against Nagorno-Karabakh’s political leadership function as a powerful tool. The current trials serve the same dual purpose for Baku that the tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh once did: rallying the Azerbaijani public against a perceived external enemy while simultaneously exerting pressure on Armenia.